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Abstract
We describe an methodology for testing a software system for possible security ﬂaws. Based on the observation
that most security ﬂaws are caused by the program’s inappropriate interactions with the environment, and triggered
by user’s malicious perturbation on the environment (which we call an environment fault), we view the security
testing problem as the problem of testing for the fault-tolerance properties of a software system. We consider each
environment perturbation as a fault and the resulting security compromise a failure in the toleration of such faults.
Our approach is based on the well known technique of fault-injection. Environment faults are injected into the system
under test and system behavior observed. The failure to tolerate faults is an indicator of a potential security ﬂaw in
the system. An Environment-Application Interaction (EAI) fault model is proposed which guides us to decide what
faults to inject. Based on EAI, we have developed a security testing methodology, and apply it to several applications.
We successfully identiﬁed a number of vulnerabilities include vulnerabilities in Windows NT operating system.
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1 Introduction
Security testing
Reports of security violations due to software errors are
becoming increasingly common. We refer to such errors
as “security errors” or “security ﬂaws.” This has resulted
in security related concerns among software developers
and users regarding the “robustness” of the software they
use. All stages of software development are motivated
by the desire to make the product secure and invulnera-
ble to malicious intentions of some users. Our work is
concerned with the testing of software with the goal of
detecting errors that might lead to security violations.
Traditional methods for detecting security ﬂaws in-
clude penetration analysis and formal veriﬁcation of secu-
rity kernels [17, 19]. Penetration analysis relies on known
security ﬂaws in software systems other than the one be-
ing tested. A team of individuals is given the responsibil-
ity of penetrating the system using this knowledge. For-
mal methods use a mathematical description of the secu-
rity requirements and that of the system that implements
the requirements. The goal of these methods is to show
formally that the requirements are indeed met by the sys-
tem.
A weakness of penetration analysis is that it requires
one either to know or be able to postulate the nature of
ﬂaws that might exist in a system. Further, the effective-
ness of penetration analysis is believed to be as good as
that of the team that performs the analysis. A lack of an
objectivecriterion to measure the adequacyof penetration
analysis leads to uncertainty in the reliability of the soft-
ware system for which penetration analysis did not reveal
any security ﬂaws.
Attractive due to the precision they provide, formal
methods suffer from the inherent difﬁculty in specifying
the requirements, the system, and then applying the pro-
cess of checking the requirements speciﬁcation against
system speciﬁcation.
Recently, several speciﬁc security testing techniques
have been developed [4, 7, 18, 23, 21, 28]. As discussed
in section 5, these techniques are either restricted to some
speciﬁc security ﬂaws or limited by the underlying testing
techniques.
Another alternative for security testing is to use gen-
eraltestingtechniques, suchaspathtesting, data-ﬂowtest-
ing, domain testing, and syntax testing [2]. However,
the effectiveness of these techniques in revealing security
ﬂaws is still unknown and more studies are needed to jus-
tify their use in testing for security ﬂaws.
Outline of our approach
Our approach for security testing employs a well known
technique in the testing of fault-tolerant systems, na- mely
fault injection. This approach has drawnupon years of re-
searchandexperienceinvulnerabilityanalysis[1,3,6,16,
20]. Our approach relies on an empirically supported be-
lief thatthe environment plays a signiﬁcant role in trigger-
ing security ﬂaws that lead to security violations [9, 16].
The problem
For the purpose of our discussion, we assume that a “sys-
tem” is composed of an “application” and its “environ-
ment.” Thus, potentially, all code that is not considered as
belonging to the application belongs to the environment.
However, we can reduce the size of the environment, by
considering only those portions of the code that have a di-
rect or indirect coupling with the application code. Such
couplingmight arise, for example, due to the application’s
use of global variables declared in the environment or the
use of common resources such as ﬁles and network ele-
ments.
For various reasons, programmers tend to make as-
sumptions about the environment in which their applica-
tion will function. When these assumptions hold, the ap-
plication is likely to behave appropriately. But, because
the environment, as a shared resource, can often be per-
turbed by other subjects, especially malicious users, these
assumptions might not be true. A secure program is one
that tolerates environment perturbations without any se-
curity violation.
If we consider environment perturbations, especially
malicious perturbation to be (malicious) faults, then a se-
cure system can be regarded as a fault-tolerant system that
is able to tolerate faults in the environment. Therefore, the
goalof testing thesecurity of asystem is reduced toensur-
ing that the system is implemented to tolerate various en-
vironment faults; not leading to security violations is con-
sidered toleration of such faults. In the remainder of this
paper, we will use the terms “ environment perturbation”
and “environment fault” interchangeably where there is
no confusion.
Fault injection–the deliberate insertion of faults into
an operational system to determine its response–offers an
effective solution to validate the dependability of fault-
tolerant computer and software systems [5]. In our ap-
proach, faults are injected into environment thereby per-
turbing it. In other words, we perturb the application en-
vironment during testing to see how the it responds and
1whether there will be a security violation under this per-
turbation. If not then the system is considered secure.
Advantages of our approach
The use of environment fault injection technique leads to
several advantages. First, in practice, it is hard to trigger
certain anomalies in the environment, and knowing how
to trigger them depends on the tester’s knowledge of the
environment. Therefore, testing software security under
those environment anomalies becomes difﬁcult. Fault in-
jection technique provides a way of emulating the envi-
ronment anomalies without having to be concerned with
how they could occur in practice. Second, our approach
provides a systematic way of deciding when to emulate
environment faults. If we want to test whether a sys-
tem will behave appropriately under certain environment
anomalies, we need to set up those environments. How-
ever, the set up time is often difﬁcult to control. If the
set up is too early, it might change during the test and the
environment state might not be we is expected when an
interaction between the application and the environment
takes place. If the environment is set up too late, the effect
it has on the application’s behavior might not serve the
purpose for which it was set up. By exploiting static in-
formation in the application and the environment’ssource
code, our approach can, however,decide deterministically
when to trigger environment faults. Third, unlike penetra-
tion analysis, where the procedure is difﬁcult to automate
and quantify, fault injection technique provides a capabil-
ity of automating the testing procedure. In addition, we
adopt a two-dimensional metrics to quantify the quality
of our testing procedure.
Research issues
Fault injection requires the selection of a fault model [5].
The choice of this model depends on the nature of faults.
Software errors arising from hardware faults, for instance,
are often modeled via bits of zeroes and ones written into
a data structure or a portion of the memory [15, 25], while
protocol implementation errors arising from communica-
tion are often modeled via message dropping, duplica-
tion, reordering, delaying etc. [14]. Understanding the na-
ture of security faults provides a basis for the application
of fault injection. Several studies have been concerned
with the nature of security faults [1, 3, 6, 16, 20].) How-
ever, we are not aware of any study that classiﬁes secu-
rity ﬂaws from the point of view of environment pertur-
bation. Some general fault models have also been widely
used [13, 26, 21, 28]. The semantic gap between these
models and the environment faults that lead to security
violations is wide and the relationship between faults in-
jectedandfaultsleadingtosecurityviolationsisnotknown.
We have developed an Environment-Application Interac-
tion
(EAI)faultmodel whichservesas the basisthe faultinjec-
tion technique described here. The advantage of the EAI
model is in its capability of emulating environment faults
that are likely to cause security violations.
Another issue in fault injection technique is the loca-
tion, within the system under test, where faults are to be
injected. In certain cases, the location is obvious. For
example, in ORCHESTRA [14], the faults emulated are
communication faults. Hence, the communication chan-
nels between communicating entities provide the obvious
location for fault injection. In other cases, where the lo-
cation is hard to decide, nondeterministic methods, such
as random selection, selection according to distribution,
are used to choose the locations. For example, FERRARI
[15] and FINE [13] use such an approach. The selection
of location is also a major issue for us. In the current
stage of our research, we inject environment faults at the
points where the environment and the application interact.
In future work, we plan to exploit static analysis to further
reduce the number of fault injection locations by ﬁnding
the equivalence relationship among those locations. The
motivation for using static analysis method is that we can
reduce the testing efforts by utilizing static information
from the program.
A general issue about software testing is “what is an
acceptable test adequacy criterion?” [10]. We adopt a
two-dimensionalcoveragemetric(codecoverageandfault
coverage) to measure test adequacy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
section 2 presents the fault model. A methodology for se-
curitytestingis presentedinsection3. In section4wewill
show the results of using this methodology in detecting
real world programs. Finally a brief overview of related
studies is presented in section 5 followed by summary of
this research and the potential for future work in section 6.
2 An Environment Fault Model
In order to determine system behavior under various en-
vironment conditions, an engineer must be able to deter-
mine the effects of environment perturbation on a given
system. Therefore, it is useful to inject faults that man-
ifest themselves as errors in systems at the environment-
application interaction level. To maintain conﬁdence in
the validity of the errors, the model used for these in-
jections should be drawn from actual environment faults,
while faults injected into the system should be able to
emulate those environment faults appropriately. One as-
sumption behind this requirement is that a security viola-
tion resulting due to the injected fault is similar to one that
results due to an environment fault that arises during the
2intended use of the system.
2.1 Terminology
Deﬁnition 2.1 (Internal State and Internal Entity) Any
element in an application’s code and data space is con-
sidered an internal entity. A state consisting of the status
of these entities is called an internal state.
Variable
￿ in a application, for example, is an internal
entity. The value of
￿ is part of an internal state. The size
of abufferused intheapplicationis alsopartof itsinternal
state. In general, all information in this application’s data
space, stack space, and heap space are part of its internal
state.
Deﬁnition 2.2 (EnvironmentEntityandEnvironmentState)
Any element that is external to an application’s code and
data space is called an environment entity. A state that
consists of the status of these entities is called an environ-
ment state.
For instance, ﬁle and network are treated as environ-
ment entities. The permission of a ﬁle, existence of a ﬁle,
ownership of a ﬁle, real user-id of a process, and the ef-
fective user-id of process are different parts of an environ-
ment state.
A key difference between an environment and an in-
ternalentity,whichmakesimplementationofasecuresys-
tem difﬁcult and error-prone, is the shared nature of the
environment entity. An application is not the only one
that can access and change an environment entity. Other
objects, such as other users, may access and change the
environment entity as well. Internal entity, on the other
hand, is private to an application in the sense that only the
application can modify and access them, assuming that
the underlying operating system provides protected pro-
cess space.
In concurrent programming, shared resources are han-
dled by using the mutual exclusion and the sema- phore
mechanism to guarantee assumptions about the state of
shared resources. However, we believe that few program-
mers use a similar mechanism to guarantee their assump-
tion about the state of the environment. There are sev-
eral reasons for this. First, programmers might not have
recognized that the environment entities are shared re-
sources. When, for example, an application writes to a
ﬁle, it checks that it has the permission to write to that
ﬁle, and then assumes that right in subsequent operations
to that ﬁle without noticing that a malicious attackercould
have change the environment thereby rendering the as-
sumption false. Most security ﬂaws resulting from race
conditions [4] are caused by such dubious assumptions.
Second, although some mechanisms, such as ﬁle locking,
guarantee that a programmer’s assumption hold on some
part of the environment state, there is no general mecha-
nism to do the same as the environment entity has various
attributes than what the mutual exclusion and semaphore
mechanisms could handle. As a result, programmers of-
ten use ad hoc mechanisms to guarantee the correctness
of their assumptions. This can lead to errors more read-
ily than would be the case when a standard mechanism is
used.
2.2 Developing a fault model
In order to provide high conﬁdence in the validity of the
security ﬂaws caused by environment faults, the method-
ology described here models systems at a high level. We
refer to this level as the Environment-Application Inter-
action (EAI) level. Fault injection at the interaction level
attempts to emulate what a “real” attacker does. Since
most of the vulnerability databases record the way attack-
ers exploit a vulnerability, we transform these exploits
to environment faults to be injected with little analysis
on those records thereby narrowing the semantic gap be-
tween faults injected at the interaction level and faults that
really occur during the intended use of the system. In con-
trast, other studies [21, 28] inject faults at the program
statement level thereby leaving a large semantic gap be-
tween faults injected and those that might arise during the
intended use of the application.
2.3 An EAI fault model
In general, environment faults affect an application in two
different ways. First, an application receives inputs from
itsenvironment. Theenvironmentfaultsnowbecomefaults
in the input, which is then inherited by an internal entity
of the application. From this point onwards the environ-
ment faults propagate through the application via the in-
ternal entities. If the application does not handle the faults
correctly, a security violation might occur. The direct rea-
son for this violation appear to be faults in the internal
entity. However, this violation is due to the propagation
of environment faults. Stated differently, the environment
indirectly causes a security violation, through the medium
of the internal entity. Figure 1(a) shows this indirect way
in which the environment faults affect an application.
Consider the following example. Suppose that an ap-
plication receives its input from the network. Any fault
in the network message related to this input is inherited
by an internal entity. When the application does a mem-
ory copy from this message to an internal buffer without
checking the buffer’s boundaries, the fault in the network
message, the fault being “message too long,” now triggers
a violation of security policy.
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Figure 1: Interaction Model
A second way in which an environment fault affects
the application is when the fault does not propagate via
the internal entity. Instead, it stays within the environment
entity and when the application interacts with the environ-
ment without correctly dealing with these faults, security
policy is violated. In this case, the environment faults are
the direct cause of security violation and the medium for
environment faults is the environment entity itself. Fig-
ure 1(b) shows this direct way in which the environment
faults affect an application.
Let us nowa consider an example to illustrate this sec-
ond kind of interaction. Suppose that an application needs
to execute a ﬁle. There are two possibilities one being that
the ﬁle belongs to the user who runs the application. Here
the environment attribute is the ﬁle’s ownership. In this
case the execution is safe. The other possibility is that
the ﬁle belongs to some malicious user. This is an en-
vironment fault created by the malicious user. Now the
individual who runs the application assumes that the ﬁle
belongs to the application. If the application does not
deal with this environment fault, it might execute arbi-
trary commands in that ﬁle thereby resulting in a security
violation.
The most error-prone interaction between an appli-
cation and the environment is that involving ﬁles. Pro-
grammers tend to use an abstraction of a ﬁle that includes
only a subset of the ﬁle attributes. A ﬁle name with a lo-
cation or ﬁle content, for example, is a commonly used
abstraction of a ﬁle. The environment faults, such as a
long ﬁle name or a ﬁle name with special characters, as-
sociated with this abstraction will propagate via the inter-
nal entity. If the application does not place appropriate
checks on these internal entities, such environment faults
will cause security violations such as those due to buffer
overﬂow and the execution of an unintended command.
The environment faults associated with the remaining ﬁle
attributes, such as whether the ﬁle is a symbolic link, the
ownership of the ﬁle, existence of the ﬁle, and the per-
missions associated with the ﬁle, will not propagate via
an internal entity. Although these attributes are extrinsic
to the application, if not dealt correctly, they are likely
to directly affect the interaction between application and
environment.
Insummary,wehavecategorizedtheenvironmentfaults
according to the way they affect applications. Environ-
ment faults which affect programs via internal entities are
calledindirectenvironmentfaults. Environmentfaultswhich
affect programs via environment entities are called direct
environment faults.
2.3.1 Indirect environment faults
Wecategorizeindirectenvironmentfaultsaccording tothe
way they propagate in the internal space. The propagation
includes initialization and use of an internal entity corre-
sponding to an environment fault. Different ways of prop-
agation are summarized in the following.
First, different kinds of environment faults are trans-
ferred to an internal entity, which has been initialized, in
different ways. Most common initializations are through
the interaction of the application with the environment, in
which case, there must be a statement in the program that
performs this initialization. However, for other initializa-
tions, there is no such statement in the application. The
initialization of an environment variable, for example, is
carried out by the operating system. The aspect of this
4kind of internal entity can easily cause mis-handling since
programmers rarely notice the initialization or even their
existence.
Second, environment faults inherited by internal en-
tities propagate in different ways since internal entities
comefromdifferentsourcesandareuseddifferently. Some
internal entities are used by the application directly in that
there are explicit statements in the application that use the
internal entities. Other internal entities are used by the
application indirectly, meaning that there is no explicit
statement in the application that uses the internal enti-
ties. Implicit usage might be caused by system calls as
system calls use some internal entities without being no-
ticed. When, for instance, a system call is made in UNIX
to executea command without using an absolute path, one
might not notice from the application that this system call
uses thePATH environmentvariableto ﬁnd thelocationof
that command. Without this knowledge on how the sys-
tem call works, programmer is unaware of this invisible
use of the internal entity and hence might make incorrect
assumptions about it.
As per the above discussion, an understanding of se-
curity ﬂaws is facilitated by dividing indirect environment
faults into the following ﬁve sub-categories according to
their origins: 1) user input, 2) environment variable, 3)
ﬁle system input, 4) network input, 5) process input.
According to vulnerability analysis reported in [1, 3,
6, 16, 20] and our analysis of a vulnerability database,
faults likely to cause security violations depend on the se-
mantics of each entity. PATH, for example, is an environ-
ment variable, and comprises a list of paths used to search
a command wheneveran application needs to execute that
command. In this case, the order of paths is important
since the search will look for that command using the or-
der speciﬁed in PATH, and the search will stop right after
it has found it. The security could most likely be affected
by changing the order of paths in the PATH variable or
appending a new path to it. Certainly, an arbitrary modiﬁ-
cation of PATH will rarely cause a security breach.
Different semantics of each internal entity is summa-
rized in Table 5.
2.3.2 Direct environment faults
Direct environment faults are perturbations of environ-
ment entities that affect an application’s behavior directly.
Unlike the internal entities, which consist only of vari-
ables, environment entities are more complex. For each
type of entity, the attributes vary. There are three types
of environment entities in a traditional operation system
model. We categorize environment faults according to
this model. These categories are enumerated as: 1) ﬁle
system, 2) process, 3) network.
Table 1: high-level classiﬁcation (total 142)
Categories Indirect En-
vironment
Fault
Direct En-
vironment
Fault
Others
number 81 48 13
percent
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Table 3: Direct Environmental Faults that Cause Security
Violations (total 48)
Categories File System Network Process
Number 42 5 1
Percent
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Studiesofsecurityviolationreports, vulnerabilitydatabases,
and vulnerability analyses suggest severalsecurity-related
attributescorrespondingtoeachenvironmententity. These
are summarized in Table 6. This list is not exhaustive,
neverthelessit providesthe common attributes that appear
inreports of securityviolations. Future vulnerability anal-
yses, however, might add new entries to the list.
2.4 Data Analysis
A security vulnerability database [16] is maintained in the
CERIAS Center at Purdue University. Currently there are
195 entries in this database which include vulnerabilities
of applications from different operating systems, such as
Windows NT, Solaris, HP-UX, and Linux. A use-
ful property of this database is that most of the vulner-
abilities are analyzed in detail either using the ﬁrst hand
knowledgefromactualpenetrationtestingor usingsecond
hand knowledge.
Among the 195 entries in the database 26 entries do
not provide sufﬁcient information for our classiﬁcation,
22 entries are caused by incorrect design, and 5 entries are
caused by incorrect conﬁguration. Both design and con-
ﬁguration errors excluded from the scope of our research.
We therefore classify only those errors that manifest di-
rectly as incorrect code in the application using the fault
model presented above. Hence the total number of entries
used for our classiﬁcation is 142.
Table 1 shows the high-level classiﬁcation of environ-
ment faults.
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ of the 142 security ﬂaws are classi-
ﬁed by using the EAI fault model; the remaining
￿
￿
￿ are
caused by software faults irrelevant to the environment.
These include errors such as those due to mistyping of the
code in the application.
Table 2 shows the classiﬁcation of indirect environ-
ment faults. Table 3 shows the classiﬁcation of direct en-
vironment faults. Data in Table 3 indicates that a signiﬁ-
cant number of part of software vulnerabilities are caused
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Categories User Input Environment Vari-
able
File System Input Network Input Process Input
Number 51 17 5 8 0
Percent
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
by the interaction with the file system environment.
Interaction with the network contributes only
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ of
all software vulnerabilities in our database. The reason
for the low percentage network-caused vulnerabilities is
that most of the network vulnerabilities are introduced by
a weak protocol design which does not fall into the scope
of our classiﬁcation. Table 4 provides further classiﬁca-
tion of file system environment faults according to
Table 6.
3 EnvironmentFaultInjectionMethod-
ology
3.1 Fault injection
Like the EAI model, which models the environment faults
at the interaction level, fault injections are also done at the
interaction level. The previous section classiﬁes the envi-
ronment faults into direct and indirect environment faults.
These faults are injected using the following mechanisms:
1. Indirect Environment Fault Injections: An in-
direct environment fault occurs at the interaction
point where an application requests its environment
for an input. The input that the environment pro-
vides to the application will most likely affect the
application’s behavior. A secure application should
tolerate an unexpected anomaly in the environment
input. One way toperturb theinput is touserandom
input as in Fuzz [8, 23]. However, this approach
dramatically increases the testing space, which and
calls for a signiﬁcantly large amount of testing ef-
fort. The Fuzz approach does not exploit the se-
mantics of each input. Our vulnerability analysis,
however,has shown that inputs most likely to cause
security violations tend to have patterns according
to their semantics. If, for instance, the input is a
list of paths used to search for a command, then se-
curity failure will most likely occur when the order
of these paths is altered, a new path is inserted or
deleted, or the length of the list is increased. Other
kinds of perturbations are less likely to cause secu-
rity failure. Thus, by an examination of rare cases
and by concentrating instead on fault patterns al-
ready observed, we reduce the testing space con-
siderably.
Faults injectedinto theapplication are based on pat-
terns that are likely to cause security faults. These
patterns come from our investigation of a vulnera-
bility database and other studies reported in the lit-
erature. The faults are summarized in Table 5.
2. Direct Environment Faults Injections: A direct
environmentfaultoccursattheinteractionpointwhere
the application accesses an environment entity for
creation, modiﬁcation, reading or execution of an
environment entity. Different status of environment
entityattributeswillaffecttheconsequencesofthose
interactions. Thus, the environment fault injections
are used to perturb the attributes of an environment
entity at points of interaction and to observe how
the application responds to the perturbation. For
example, before an application executes an open
operation to a named file, several perturbations
are performed on this ﬁle by changing its attributes
such as its existence, permissions, ownership, and
the type of the ﬁle since failure to handle these at-
tributes is most likely to cause security violations.
These attributes are and their their perturbation are
presented in Table 6.
3.2 Test adequacy criterion
An important issue in the management of software testing
is to “ensure that prior to the start of testing the objec-
tives of testing are known and agreed upon and that the
objectives are set in terms that can be measured.” Such
objectives “should be quantiﬁed, reasonable, and achiev-
able” [11].
We use fault coverage and interaction coverage mea-
sure test adequacy. Fault coverage is deﬁned as the per-
centage of the number of faults tolerated with respect to
thatof the faultsinjected. Our conjectureis thatthe higher
the fault coverage the more secure the application is. In
addition to fault coverage, an additional measurement of
the testing effort is the interaction coverage. Interaction
coverage is deﬁned as the percentage of the number of in-
teraction points where we injected faults with respect to
the total number of interaction points. Once again, we
conjecture that the higher the interaction coverage, the
more dependable the testing result are. Of course we as-
sume that faults found during testing are removed. These
6Table 4: File System Environmental Faults (total 42)
Categories ﬁle symbolic permission ownership ﬁle working
existence link invariance directory
Number 20 6 6 3 6 1
Percent
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Table 5: Indirect Environment Faults and Enviromnet Perturbations
Internal Entity Semantic Attribute Fault Injections
User Input file name + direc-
tory name
change length, use relative path, use absolute path, insert special characters such as “..”,
“
￿ ” in the name
command change length, use relative path, use absolute path, insert special characters such as “
  ”,
“
! ”, “
" ” or newline in the command
file name + direc-
tory name
change length, use relative path, use absolute path, use special characters, such as “
  ”, “
! ”
or “
" ” in the name
Environment
Variable
execution path + li-
brary path
change length, rearrange order of path, insert a untrusted path, use incorrect path, use
recursive path
permission mask change mask to 0 so it will not mask any permission bit
File Sys-
tem Input
file name + direc-
tory name
change length, use relative path, use absolute path, use special characters in the name such
as “
  ”, “&” or “
" ” in name
file extension change to other ﬁle extensions like “.exe” in Windows system; change length of ﬁle exten-
sion
IP address change length of the address, use bad-formatted address
Network packet change size of the packet, use bad-formatted packet
Input host name change length of host name, use bad-formatted host name
DNS reply change length of the DNS reply, use bad-formatted reply
Process
Input
message change length of the message, use bad-formatted message
Table 6: Direct Environment Faults and Environment Perturbations
Environment Entity Attribute Fault Injections
file existence delete an existing ﬁle or make a non-existing ﬁle exist
file ownership change ownership to the owner of the process, other normal users, or root
File file permission ﬂip the permission bit
System symbolic link if the ﬁle is a symbolic link, change the target it links to; if the ﬁle is not a symbolic link,
change it to a symbolic link
file content invari-
ance
modify ﬁle
file name invariance change ﬁle name
working directory start application in different directory
message authenticity make the message come from other network entity instead of where it is expected to come
from
protocol purposely violates underlying protocol by omitting a protocol step, adding an extra step,
reordering steps
socket share the socket with another process
Network service availability deny the service that application is asking for
entity trustability change the entity with which the application interacts to a untrusted one
message authenticity make the message come from other process instead of where it is expected to come from
Process process trustability change the entity with which the application interacts to a untrusted one
service availability deny the service that application is asking for
7two coverage criteria lead to a 2-dimensional metric for
measuring test adequacy.
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Figure 2: Test Adequacy Metric
Figure2showsthe2-dimensionalmetricandfoursam-
ple points of signiﬁcance. The metric serves as a quanti-
tative evaluation of a test set. Point 1 is representative of
the region where testing resulted in low interaction and
fault coverage. In this case testing is considered inade-
quate. Point 2 is representative of the region where the
fault coverage is high but interaction coverage is low. The
test is considered inadequate since in this test, only a few
interactions are perturbed, how the system behaves under
perturbation of other interactions is still unknown.
Point 3 is representativeof an insecure region because
the fault coverage is so low that we consider the applica-
tion is likely to be vulnerable to the perturbation of the en-
vironment. Thesafest regionis indicated by point4 which
corresponds to a high interaction and fault coverage.
3.3 Procedure
TheprocedureofourEnvironmentFaultInjectionMethod-
ology consists of the following steps:
1. Set count and n to 0.
2. For each test case, do step 3 to 9.
3. Foreach interaction pointin theexecutiontrace, de-
cide if the application asks for an input. If there is
no input, only inject direct environment faults; if
there is an input, inject both direct and indirect en-
vironment faults.
4. Decide the object where faults will be injected.
5. Establish a fault list corresponding to this object us-
ing Table5 and Table 6.
6. For each fault in the list, inject it before the inter-
action point for the direct environment faults; inject
each fault after the interaction point for the indirect
environment faults since in this case, we want to
change the value the internal entity receives from
the input.
7. Increase n by 1.
8. Detect if security policy is violated. If so, increase
count by 1.
9. Calculate interaction coverage. If the test adequacy
criteriaforinteractioncoverageissatisﬁedthenstop
else repeat steps 3-9 until the adequacy criteria for
interaction coverage is achieved.
10. Divide count by n yielding
# to obtain the vulner-
ability assessment score (fault coverage) for the ap-
plication.
3.4 Example
To illustrate the steps shown above,we consider an exam-
ple of fault injection. The following code is taken from
BSD version of lpr.c. Notice that lpr is a privileged
application. It is a set-UID application which means
that it runs in the root’s privilege even when it is invoked
by a user who does not havethe same privilegeas theroot.
f = create(n, 0660);
if (f<0) {
printf(‘‘%s: cannot create %s’’, name, n);
cleanup();
}
... (code skipped here)
if (write(f, buf, i)!=i) {
printf(‘‘%s: %s: temp file write error\n’’,
name, n);
break;
}
Suppose that we have decided to perturb the environ-
ment at a place where the create system call is issued.
This is an interaction point where lpr interacts with the
file system. There is no input in this case and hence
we simply carry out direct environment fault injections.
The next step is to identify the object. Here, n is a
ﬁle name, and hence the object is the ﬁle referred to using
this ﬁle name. Then we refer to Table 6 and get a list of at-
tributes that need to be perturbed. This list includes 1) ﬁle
existence, 2) ﬁle ownership, 3) ﬁle permission, 4) sym-
bolic link, 5) ﬁle content invariance, 6) ﬁle name invari-
ance and 7) working directory. A further analysis shows
thatattributes 5 and 6 are not applicable in this case as this
is supposed to be the ﬁrst time the ﬁle is encountered.
We then perturb the remaining four attributes of the
ﬁle and inject the faults into the application. For example,
the perturbation of the “existence” means that we make
8the ﬁle exist or not exist before the application creates it.
The perturbation of “symbolic link” means that we make
the ﬁle link to some other ﬁle, such as the password ﬁle,
before the application creates it.
After fault injection, we execute the application and
detect if there is any violation of the security policy. In
this case the violation is detected when we perturb at-
tributes 1, 2, 3 and 4. Doing so causes lpr to write to
a ﬁle even when the user who runs it does not have the
appropriate ownership and ﬁle permissions. Thus when
the ﬁle is linked to the password ﬁle, the password ﬁle is
be modiﬁed by lpr. The problem here is that the applica-
tion assumes that the ﬁle does not exist before the creation
or assumes that the ﬁle belongs to the user who runs the
application. In a real environment, this assumption could
easily be false and the fault injection test points out a se-
curity vulnerability.
4 Result
4.1 Turnin
Turnin is a program used in Purdue for electronically
submitting ﬁles for grading. Before students in a class
can use this program, the teaching assistant (TA) for this
class shouldhave set up his account (or a dedicated course
account) correspondly. This includes creating a submit
directory under the home directory of this account, cre-
ating a Projlist ﬁle under submit directory, which
speciﬁes a list of projects students could be able to turnin.
Students can type “turnin -c coursename -l” to view the
list of projects; students can type “turnin -c coursename-p
projectname ﬁles” to turnin their project ﬁles. After sub-
mission, the submitted ﬁles will be copied to TA’s sub-
mit directory.
Since turnin program allows students to copy their
ﬁles to TA’s protected directory, the program is running
as SUID, which means its effective user is root. The
program consists of 1310 lines of code.
Following our method, we have identiﬁed 8 interac-
tion places where programmers could possibly have made
assumptions abouttheenvironment. We make41 environ-
ment perturbation to check whether programmers indeed
made the assumptions, and whether the failure of these
assumptions can affect program’s security. Among those
perturbations, 9 perturbation lead to security violation,
which means the failure of assumptions on these 9 situa-
tion could lead to a vulnerability in the program. Then we
investigated each assumptions by asking whether they are
reasonable. For example, programmers obviously made
anassumptionthat/usr/local/lib/turnin.cfﬁle
is trusted. Our perturbation testing found out if this as-
sumptions is false, the system’s security will be violated.
Since the turnin.cf will always be protected, so is its
directory, we believe the assumption is quite reasonable,
there is no vulnerability regarding to this assumption.
However, one assumption seems unreasonable to us,
it turns out to be a vulnerability,and is hence exploited by
us after we have known the assumption. The problematic
code is list in the following:
if ((FILE *)0 == (fp = fopen(pcFile, "r"))) {
printf("can not find project list file\n");
exit(9);
}
Since fopen is an interaction point where potential
assumption might be made, we perturb the environment
status of pcFile, making it only readable by root, not
by the people who is running the turnin program. The
result is that by running “turnin -c coursename -l”, we
can successfully read the contents of the ﬁle we are not
supposed to be able to read. So, here the programmers
have made an assumption that people are allowed to read
ﬁle pointed by pcFile using turnin program, and its
failure can cause security violation. Now, the question
is: is this assumption reasonable? The result turns out to
be NO since TA can make pcFile point to any ﬁle he
wants, then using turnin program to read the contents
of that ﬁle.
Knowing this fact, we designed a following scenario:
aTAmakestheProjlistasymboliclinkto/etc/shadow,
which is not readable by anyone except root. Then the
TA runs “turnin -c coursename -l”, Voila, the program
prints out the content of /etc/shadow!
Another perturbation we have done is perturbing the
attributes of the argument in the following code:
execve (acTar, nargv, environ);
Since nargv contains ﬁle names, according to table 5,
we have inserted special characters, such as “/“, “../”, in
front of the ﬁle names. The program does a good job in
forbidding the “/” character,however,it does not resist the
perturbation of inserting “../” in the front. Knowing this
fact, a student can submit several“.login” ﬁles with differ-
ent number of “../” in front of the “.login” ﬁle, such that
when his TA unpacks the submitted ﬁle, the TA’s “.lo-
gin” will be overwritten by the student’s malicious “.lo-
gin” ﬁle, which can do anything evil to the TA.
The turnin program has been used in Purdue Uni-
versitywidelysince1993, andwebecametheﬁrsttoiden-
tify these vulnerabilities. After our discovery, the unver-
sityquickly veriﬁed andproblem and patched itsturnin
program.
4.2 Windows NT Registry
In Windows NT operation system, registry directory is
a critical part to the system security. Registry directory
9is essentially an organized stored for operating system’s
and application’s data which are globally shared by dif-
ferent applications and different components of the oper-
ating system. An appropriate conﬁguration on each reg-
istry key in the registry directory is a key factor for secu-
rity. Many security vulnerabilities has been reported due
to an inappropriate conﬁguration of the registry keys. In
the Windows NT 4.0 (SP3), there are still keys that are
not protected. Our task is to test the related modules of
the operating system, and ﬁnd if it is secure to leave those
registry keys unprotected.
First of all, we use static analysis technique to ﬁnd out
where these unprotected keys are used, then we apply the
EPA method to ﬁnd if programmers have made assump-
tions that can fail.
The result is a surprise! We have identiﬁed 9 unpro-
tected registry keys that could be exploited to break the
system security, and indeed we came up with test cases
to actually exploit the vulnerabilities. Furthermore, based
on the similarities of these 9 registry keys and other 20
unprotected keys, we speculate that the same vulnerabili-
ties exist for those 20 keys as well. However, we have not
been able to perturb the modules that used the other 20
keys yet due to the lack of knowledge of how those mod-
ules work. The 9 registry keys that we have exploited are
the results of applying our perturbation technique.
Due to the agreement with Microsoft, we are not re-
vealing the exact keys and source codes that have the vul-
nerabilities. So, in the next discussion, we will not refer
to any speciﬁc key, except the purpose of the key and the
problem with the key.
One of the keys in the registry directory speciﬁes a
ﬁle name for a font. It seems pretty safe to give every-
body the right to modify this registry key until we have
found a module in the system that invokes a function call
to actually delete this ﬁle. To know whether the program
has done the correct checking before the delete or not, we
did a perturbation on the properties of this ﬁle according
to Table 6, making it writable only by administrator, and
also making it point to a very important ﬁle (such as sys-
tem conﬁguration ﬁle, password ﬁle) instead of just a font
ﬁle. It turns out that the program fails to respond securely
underthisenvironmentperturbation-whenadministrators
run this module, they will actually delete the ﬁle speciﬁed
by this registry key regardless of whether this ﬁle is a font
ﬁle or a security critical ﬁle. The assumption behind of
this “delete” environment interaction is that the program-
mers assume the ﬁle name always points to a font ﬁle or
a unimportant ﬁle, however,since everybody has the right
to modify the value of this registry key, the assumption
fail to sustain.
Anothervulnerabilitywehavefoundisassociatedwith
user logon module. When a user logons, the module will
ﬁnd the user’s proﬁle from a directory speciﬁed in a reg-
istry key. Using our EAI model, we have managed to per-
turb the trustability attribute of the directory, and found
out that the program does not deal with the situation when
the directory is not trusted, which means, whenevera user
logons, the logon module will go to the untrusted direc-
tory, and grab a speciﬁed proﬁle for you. Therefore, by
the environment perturbation, we have found out that pro-
grammers have made a fatal assumption about the trusta-
bility of the proﬁle directory. After knowing the fact, it
becomes straightforward to design a test case and fail the
programmers’ assumptions.
5 Related Work
A signiﬁcant amount of computer security testing is per-
formed using penetration testing. Security is assessed by
attempting to break into an installed system by exploit-
ing well-known vulnerabilities. Several researchers, in-
cluding Linde and Attanasio [17], Pﬂeeger [24], describes
the process of penetration testing. Pﬂeeger points out that
penetration testing is prone to several difﬁculties. First,
there is usually no simple procedure to identify the appro-
priate cases to test. Error prediction depends on the skill,
experience, and familiarity with the system of the creator
of the hypotheses. Second, there is no well deﬁned and
tested criterion used to decide when to stop penetration
testing. Statistical analysis is needed to show how much
conﬁdence we can gain after a certain “quantity” of pene-
tration testing has been done. Penetration testing does not
provide such a metric. Third, it is difﬁcult to develop a
test plan as it not only needs familiarity with system but
also needs skill and experience. It is also possible that
testers do not know how to develop a test to investigate
some hypotheses due to the limitation of their knowledge
of the environment. This might lead to a decrease in our
conﬁdence in the test result as attackers might know what
the testers do not know.
Our research attempts to overcome the above men-
tioned difﬁculties. It has a deterministic procedure to con-
duct and test, a criterion to decide when testing should
stop. It overcomes the limitation of the lack of knowledge
of the environment by emulating possible attacks using
the faults injection technique. Finally, our approach over-
comes the limitation of testers’ knowledge by offering a
set of concrete faults that should be injected into applica-
tion.
AdaptiveVulnerability Analysis (AVA) is designed by
Ghosh et al. to quantitatively assess information system
security and survivability. This approach exercises soft-
ware in source-code form by simulating incoming mali-
cious and non-malicious attacks that fall under various
threat classes [21, 22, 27, 28]. In this respect, our own
10work parallels the AVA approach. A major divergenceap-
pears, however, with respect to how incoming attacks are
simulated. AVA chooses to perturb the internal state of
the executing application by corrupting the ﬂow of data
and the internal states assigned to application variables.
Our approach chooses to perturb the environment state
by changing the attributes of the environment entity and
perturbing the input that an application receives from the
environment. Our approach should be considered as com-
plementary to AVA.
For attacks that do not affect the internal states of an
application, AVA appears incapable of simulating them
by only perturbing the internal states. For vulnerabilities
that are caused purely by incorrect internal states, our ap-
proach cannot simulate them by only perturbing the en-
vironment. One disadvantage of the AVA is the seman-
tic gap between the attacks during the use of an applica-
tion and the perturbation AVA makes during testing. In
other words, knowing that the application fails under cer-
tain perturbation, it is difﬁcult to derive what kind of at-
tacks correspond to this failure. This makes it difﬁcult to
assess the validity of the perturbation. Our approach nar-
rows the semantic gap by perturbing at the environment-
application level since most attacks really occur due to
intentional perturbation of the environment.
Fuzz is a black-box testing method designed by Miller
et al. It feeds randomly generated input stream to sev-
eral system utilities, including login, ftp, telnet.
The results show that
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Different patterns of input could possibly cause more ap-
plications to fail. Inputs made under different environ-
mental circumstances could also lead to abnormal behav-
ior. Other testing methods could expose these problems
where random testing, by its very nature, might not [9].
Rather than rely on random inputs, our approach exploits
those input patterns that could possibly cause security vi-
olations.
Bishop and Dilger studied one class of the time-of-
check-to-time-of-use (TOCTTOU) ﬂaws [4]. A TOCT-
TOU ﬂaw occurs when an application checks for a partic-
ular characteristic of an object and then takes some ac-
tion that assumes the characteristic still holds when in
fact it does not. This approach focuses on a source-code
based technique for identifying patterns of code which
could have this programming condition ﬂaw. One of its
limitations is that static analysis cannot always determine
whether the environmental conditions necessary for this
class of TOCTTOU ﬂaws exist [4]. The authors conclude
that dynamic analyzers could help test the environment
during execution and warn when an exploitable TOCT-
TOU ﬂaw occurs. Our approach is dynamic. Instead
of detecting dangerous environment conditions, we in-
ject dangerous environment conditions and see whether
the application will fail.
Fink and Levitt employ application-slicing technique
to test privileged applications. Speciﬁcations are used to
slice an application to an executable subset relevant to the
speciﬁcation, and manual methods are used to derive test
data for the slice. By using application slices as the ba-
sis of security testing, they assume that testing a slice is
equivalent to testing the whole application [7]. The moti-
vation behind the application-slicing technique is to focus
on a reduced and less complex portion of the application
suchthatotherstaticand dynamicanalyses aremademore
efﬁcient. We believe this to be a signiﬁcant step in secu-
rity testing. However, what is missing in this approach is
an efﬁcient testing technique used to test the slices. This
paper assumes general testing methods can be used to test
the slices and the effectiveness of their approach depends
on the effectiveness of general testing methods on reveal-
ing security ﬂaws, which, as far as we know, is still un-
known.
Gligorhasproposedasecuritytestingmethod. Itelim-
inates redundant test cases by 1) using a variant of control
synthesis graphs, 2) analyzing dependencies between de-
scriptive kernel-call speciﬁcations, and 3) exploiting ac-
cess check separability. The method is used to test the Se-
cure Xenix kernel [18]. A key drawback of this approach
is that it cannot detect the fact that entire sequences of
functions, i.e. access check computations, may be miss-
ing [12] as many security ﬂaws are caused by the missing
of access checking and input validity checking.
6 Summary and Future Work
We have presented a white-box security testing method-
ology using environment perturbation technique, a vari-
ant of the fault injection technique. The methodology is
based on the Environment-Application Interaction (EAI)
model, which captures the properties of a family of soft-
ware vulnerability. We have applied this methodology to
several real-world systems and applications, and we have
successfully identiﬁed a number of security ﬂaws that ex-
ist for several years without being discovered.
Futurework willconcentrateon applyingthismethod-
ology to more applications. We are in the progress of de-
veloping and conducting a set of experiments to evaluate
the effectiveness of this methodology. In the future, we
hope to be able to develop a prototype tool for security
testing based on this methodology.
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